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Abstract
Survey research from political science indicates that people are quite suspicious of ambitious
decision makers; that people who desire power are self-serving and not to be trusted.  In this
paper, we use an original laboratory experiment to test not only whether people prefer non-
ambitious decision makers, but also whether people will seek to balance ambitious decision
makers with non-ambitious decision makers, allowing for interactions with gender.  In the
experiment, participants are told two decision makers will be dividing some valuable resource on
their behalf.  One decision maker (either high or low in ambition) is “appointed.”  Participants
vote from a slate of candidates, about whom they have information on gender and ambition, for
the second decision maker.  We find that people tend to associate high ambition with male and
self-interested behavior, and that the selection of the second decision maker, regardless of
ambition, falls along gender lines, suggesting important implications for research on vote choice
and representation.
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Political theorists have long recognized a paradox underlying the exercise of political
power: citizens generally do not trust leaders who desire power, but those who do not desire
power are, almost by definition, unlikely to become political leaders. Machiavelli  ([1515] 2004;
see Chapter VII) advised his prince to avoid publicly revealing a desire for power because to do
so was to invite “hatred and contempt”.1  James Madison went even further, suggesting that
ambition, or the desire for power, poisons republican government ([1788] 2003).  Machiavelli
and Madison both recognized that political leaders who take up office as a duty, a burden of
public service, are viewed as more legitimate and trustworthy than those who are perceived to
pursue power as an individual prize to be won.  The latter are seen as self-interested,
untrustworthy and a threat to the greater good.  
This notion that those who crave power invite mistrust rings intuitively true.  Consider
Alexander Haig’s infamous quote, “As for now, I’m in control here.”  This statement was made
in response to the shooting of President Ronald Reagan in 1981, and was meant to provide a
reassurance of effective and competent government in a time of crisis.  Instead, Haig was seen as
making an unseemly grasp for power—as Secretary of State, he constitutionally most definitely
was not in control.  The vice president was. The resulting negative public outcry forced Haig to
resign.2  More systematically, congressional scholars repeatedly find that citizens’ main objection
1 See also Chapter VII of The Prince where Machiavelli discusses how Severus, by not disclosing
“that he wanted to become emperor,” afforded him “immense prestige (that) always protected
him from the hatred that the people might have had for him because of his rapacious deeds”
([1515] 2004: 69).
2 Alexander Haig made this statement following the assassination attempt on President Reagan in
1981.  Serving as Secretary of State to President Reagan, Alexander Haig ignored Constitutional
protocol that the Vice President is next in line for the presidency.  Thus, his quote appears like an
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to members of Congress is not the policies they are producing, but rather the perception that they
are in office because they crave power, that they are using the office as a way to further their own
self-interest (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002, 1995). 
In sum, people who are seen as craving power are perceived as less legitimate political
leaders than those who are not seen as craving power.  Thus, overt ambition for power is a
political liability; a claim recognized by political thinkers such as Machiavelli and Madison,
supported by public opinion studies, and reflected in everything from the popularity of term limit
laws to an intuitively understandable preference for political leaders such as, say, George
Washington and Colin Powell over, say, Richard Nixon and Alexander Haig.  The problem, of
course, is that most political leaders are ambitious for power.  Even Washington stood for
election, which is, by definition, an open declaration of a desire to wield political influence.
So what is it about being perceived as overly ambitious that engenders mistrust in
political leaders and undermines their legitimacy?  Do people really prefer policymakers who
exhibit a distinct lack of enthusiasm for the offices they actually hold?  If so, why?  After all, we
presumably do not invest greater confidence in physicians or mechanics who assure us they really
are not interested in medical careers or cars.  In this paper we seek to shed some light on these
questions by building a conceptual framework that explains why a universal predisposition to
mistrust certain types of leaders might exist, what traits would trigger this mistrust, and how
people would behaviorally respond to these leaders.  We distinguish between positive ambition
(associated with competence, and a desire to carry out multiple responsibilities and serve
communal goals) and negative ambition (an individualistic craving for power).  Decisions made
by policy makers characterized by negative ambition, we argue, triggers mistrust and a loss of
legitimacy, and prompts predictable behavioral responses from those affected by the decisions.
overly ambitious and illegal attempt to seize power.
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This is an argument with extensive empirical support in anthropology, where negative ambition
cues are referred to as “big man” behavior.  Responses to big man behavior are consistent cross
culturally and are generally seen as a product of a universal human predisposition that evolved to
deal with the adaptive problems of group living (Boehm 1999).  A series of original laboratory
experiments provide support to our argument, which has interesting implications for how people
are likely to react to political leaders, especially in supporting female versus male political
leaders.
Negative Ambition and the Big Man
Political scientists have long known that people value certain traits in political leaders.
Charisma, enthusiasm (Ammeter et al 2002), being decisive and strong (Miller, Wattenberg, and
Malanchuk 1986), commanding respect and possessing an ability to “provide strong leadership”
(Kinder 1986; Kinder et al 1980) are all seen as positive attributes in political leaders.  Such
personal traits have long been considered a factor in voting decisions and shaping personal
evaluations of political candidates (e.g. Campbell et al 1960; Stokes 1966).  Political scientists
also recognize that these personal characteristics are easier for citizens to relate and respond to
than the policy positions of candidates (Lau 1986; Rahn et al 1990).  People use these personal
traits to make “dispositional judgments” about the future behavior of candidates, using them to
evaluate fitness for office (Kinder 1986; Miller, Wattenberg and Malanchuk 1986).  
Not all personal traits are viewed positively; this same stream of research makes clear that
certain traits are seen as serious drawbacks in political leaders.  Notably, Kinder et al (1980, 319)
find being “power-hungry” the most negative personality attribute that can be assigned to a
candidate.  Indeed, this trait is found to be the strongest negative predictor of candidate
trustworthiness, and clearly shapes dispositional judgments to the detriment of those possessing
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these traits.  Why should desire to hold a position of influence be such a powerful influence in
driving negative evaluations of political leaders?
One potential answer to this question is that citizens perceive they are less likely to get
what they want from government from self-interested, power hungry politicians.  This makes
intuitive sense, but the empirical case that citizens’ mistrust of power-seekers is based on some
internal calculation about the likely policy consequences is weak.  For example, people generally
view Congress as self-interested and its members as craving power, yet policy outcomes seem to
have little to do with shaping such attitudes (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002).  Rather than
situational or instrumental outcomes, deep-rooted behavioral predispositions related to process
seem to have a better case for being the underlying explanatory cause of such attitudes.  
There is a strong empirical case to support the claim that a deep-rooted aversion to
power-seeking in leaders is an innate, universal human behavioral predisposition.  One of the
more consistent findings in the anthropological literature is negative responses to self-
aggrandizing behavior on the part of those in leadership positions.  Humans have a strong
aversion to what is termed “upstartism” or “big man” behavior, which describes people who act
like they deserve special treatment, elevated status and the freedom to put their individual
interests above the group (Boehm 1999).  This claim is clearly generalizable across cultures and
is independent of particular policy outcomes, social complexity and sophistication of political
system.  The basic pattern is seen in hunter gatherer groups and in the reaction to Alexander
Haig’s claim to be in control:  Political leaders perceived to desire power in order to serve self-
interested ends invite a backlash.   Such perceptions engender resentment and suspicion,
undermine legitimacy, and often lead to removal from power.  Using ethnographic reports of
tribal societies and foraging groups, Boehm finds that leaders who aggressively pursue positions
of influence and use them to promote their own self-interest, i.e. engage in “big-man” behavior,
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tend to be met with high levels of distrust as well as costly sanctions (Boehm 1999).  He
attributes the universality to anti-big-man behavior as an evolved predisposition to the pressures
of group living.  
Although the aversion to “big-man” behavior is universal – meaning, both men and
women elicit negative responses – the description itself is not gender neutral.  Generally
speaking, males dominate social hierarchies and, as far as can be told, have always dominated
social hierarchies (Pratto 1996: 179).  Compared to females, both the psychological and
anthropological research literatures agree that males are much more oriented towards status and
dominance hierarchies.  Two potential reasons are forwarded to explain such gender differences.
One is socialization, i.e. that a system of gender-specific behavioral expectations or roles are
institutionalized (invariably to the advantage of men and the disadvantage of women; see Ferree,
Lorber and Hess 1999; Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1999).  The other is that there are innate
psychological differences between males and females, differences generally seen as products of
evolved responses to differing adaptive problems (notably, though not exclusively, reproduction.
See Eagly 1995; Buss 1995; Campbell 2002).  These are not mutually exclusive explanations--
nature and nurture can share the explanatory role—but both point towards males being more
competitive, aggressive, risk tolerant, status oriented, and oriented towards dominance
hierarchies (for surveys of the relevant literature see Eagly 1995; Boehm 1993; Buss 1999;
Pinker 1997; Ridley 2003).  This suggests good reasons to believe big man behavior is going to
be a predominantly male trait.
But why would big man behavior prompt such universal negative responses?
Evolutionary psychology argues this is a human trait that evolved as a result of the selection
pressures surrounding the adaptive problems of group living.  Groups are broadly recognized as
providing key fitness advantages to humans, and human psychology unsurprisingly has evolved
6
to deal with complex social environments; politics itself is rooted in the “groupishness” of
humans and their socially-oriented minds (Hibbing and Alford 2004; Massey 2002).  While
providing clear fitness advantages (mutual protection, collective action benefits), groups also
raise a particular set of problems (competition over resources and access to mates, conflict over
status and position in dominance hierarchies).  Groups can benefit enormously from competent
leadership, which can help solve these and other collective action problems.  A leader who is
genuinely committed to group interests is thus going to provide an enormous advantage to the
social collective.  A self-interested leader, though, is worse than a free rider—in effect, they are
in a position to unilaterally seek rents, i.e. to extract individual benefits by imposing costs on the
rest of the group.  Anthropologists such as Boehm (1999) thus argue that anti-big-man
predispositions serve the purpose of promoting “good” leaders (those who are competent, can
provide solutions to a range of collective action problems, and are committed to group interests),
and discouraging “bad” leaders (those who put their own interests above those of the group).
This is what separates positive ambition (associated with competence, and a desire to carry out
multiple responsibilities and serve communal goals) and negative ambition (an individualistic
craving for power). 
Negative ambition is a cue to a potentially “bad” leader that prompts “leveling
mechanisms.”  We can think of these mechanisms as innate, anti-big-man predispositions.  These
leveling mechanisms are produced independent of outcomes—a leader might share the wealth,
but if they are seen as getting too big for their britches there is an almost automatic reflexive
desire to bring them down a peg or two.  The most prominent examples of such leveling
mechanisms in the small scale societies studied by Boehm are public opinion, disobedience,
criticism and ridicule, and even violent overthrow that results in the killing of big men (Boehm
1993).  The same basic psychological mechanisms operate in more complex societies, and offer a
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ready explanation for the erosion of trust in government.  In fact, the most visible evidence about
the traits of decision makers is that they are motivated by a desire to seek office (Mayhew 1974);
a red flag to citizens that such decision makers crave power.  Put simply, political leaders are
now more likely to be seen as big men, and as a result, their legitimacy is constantly under
surveillance. 
Tyler (1998: 270) writes that “trust is a key component of the willingness to defer to
authorities.”  Trust can be defined as a willingness to take a risk on others, the expectation that
others will not act in a self-serving manner, whereas trustworthiness is based on judgments about
the motivations of the one being trusted (Hardin 2002: 31).  In other words, trust is predicated on
the perception that a leader is not going to act as a big man.
Big man behavior—and, again, there are good reasons to expect this to be specifically a
male behavior—will invite mistrust.  Applying this logic to modern politics, it stands to reason
that political candidates exhibiting overly ambitious or power-hungry behavior are also likely to
incur negative reactions from the rank and file; i.e. the public.  Indeed, Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse (2002) find that the perception of members of Congress as self-interested decision makers
forces the participatory hand of the public.  While people would prefer non-self-interested,
objective decision makers, the motives of members of Congress rarely project this image.  People
tend to equate ambition with self-serving behavior; that those pursuing office are in it for
themselves and do not consider and are unable to relate to the needs of ordinary Americans.  As
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse find, and in line with Boehm’s (1999) argument, people engage in the
political process not out of concerns for civic duty or the public interest, but out of a deeply
rooted concern to avoid being taken advantage of by self-interested decision makers (see also
Alford and Hibbing 2004).  
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The rise of candidate-centered campaigns and relentless media coverage of individual
candidates creates a steady image of big man behavior, something that is intuitively understood
by those who seek to gain political advantage by directly portraying their opponents as archetypal
big men (my opponent serves special interests, he will betray the interests of the constituency etc.
etc.).  As a result, people will be more likely to engage in leveling behavior against others
perceived as possessing negative ambition.  Moreover, as we argue, people will not only be more
likely to distrust those who crave power but they will also be more likely to incur costs to prevent
“big-men” from making binding decisions.  
Negative Ambition and Gender Stereotypes
Despite the clear implications for understanding political behavior, there have been
surprisingly few empirical attempts to directly assess the behavioral implications of negative
ambition.  While it is fairly well established that negative ambition will prompt a leveling
mechanism response, it is less clear what form that response will take under given circumstances.
Will people seek to balance ambitious policy makers with non-ambitious policymakers?  Is
negative ambition really a male trait and, if so, what are the implications for support of female
policymakers?  Are people so averse to negative ambition that the behavioral response occurs
even independent of outcomes? 
From both anecdotal and empirical evidence we know that any behavior on the part of
candidates that projects self-aggrandizing or power-hungry behavior will be met with intense
public criticism (think Alexander Haig).  We also know the opposite will be met with general
favorability (think George Washington or Colin Powell).  We know that, as Machiavelli advised,
personal ambition and the drive for power are personality traits that campaign strategists seek
most to suppress in their own candidates.  Indeed, historian Evan Cornog (2004: 60) writes that
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“One of the most venerable traits in American politics is that of the reluctant candidate.”  The
campaign strategist able to cast their candidate as the equivalent of Colin Powell and their
opponent as the equivalent of Alexander Haig is likely to increase their chances of electoral
success.  Indeed, the viability of the “humble” politician started with George Washington and
continues today (Cornog 2004: 61).3  
Yet political science research has presented a convincing empirical case that those in
powerful policymaking positions are also among the most ambitious in society (e.g. Maestas
2003; Ehrenhalt 1992; Schlesinger 1966).  Unfortunately, this empirical research focuses solely
on the self-reported ambitions of decision-makers themselves, ignoring how people react to the
personal ambitions of officeholders and office seekers.  Given the argument we present here, this
omission is significant, especially given findings on trait inferences suggesting political leaders
exhibiting “power-hungry” behavior (Kinder et al. 1980) or lacking “humbleness” (Miller,
Wattenberg, and Malanchuk 1986) are viewed negatively.4  
Because of its ability to impose strong controls, experimental research offers an obvious
approach to disentangling and testing the interaction between leadership style and policy
acceptance.  Yet most experiments addressing the issues we raise treat the decision maker as
ambition-neutral and/or gender-neutral.  To our knowledge, Van Vugt et al. (2004) and Hibbing
and Alford (2004) are the only two experiments that purposely vary leadership style and force
3 Candidates have also been known to lament their humble childhood as a way to offset their
personal ambitions and create an image that they have earned their position of power (i.e.
Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and Bill Clinton).
4 Likewise, we also know that Machiavellianism tends to be associated with untrustworthy and
dishonest behavior (Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe, and Smith 2002; Wilson, Near, and Miller 1998,
1996; see also Brandstatter and Konigstein 2001).  
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participants to make a decision in which they have a stake in the outcome, but even they do not
address gender.5  
Using a public goods scenario, Van Vugt et al. (2004) attempt to determine whether the
characteristics of group leaders affect the likelihood of group abandonment.  The authors find
that people are significantly more likely to exit the group given an autocratic leader, e.g. one in
which the leader uses individual discretion in deciding who will contribute, compared to a group
with a democratic leader, i.e. one in which contribution to the public good is voluntary.  This is
significant given that exiting the group results in being placed in a leaderless group where the
likelihood of achieving the group bonus is even more uncertain.  Furthermore, they find people in
the autocratic condition exhibit significantly less procedural satisfaction than people in the
democratic condition.  In other words, the style of group leaders affects whether group members
stay with the group and whether they are satisfied with the decision-making process.  In fact, Van
Vugt et al. conclude that “fewer members might have exited the autocratically led groups if their
members had been elected or appointed on merit” (11).  In short, it is not only how leaders
exercise power that affects group behavior, but also the means through which leaders attain
power.
Hibbing and Alford (2004) find that the means through which a leader attains power can
also affect political behavior.  Using ultimatum bargaining games, Hibbing and Alford find that
5 Hoffman et al. (1996) do vary whether decision makers earn power in ultimatum bargaining
scenarios by telling receivers that the role of the decision maker was based on responses to a
current event quiz.  While this creates the perception of “earned” power, thus allowing for useful
insight into how people react to variations in the acquisition of power, the authors are only
interested in how dividers allocate resources.  They do not report findings on how receivers
respond to such variation.
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people tend to be more accepting of decisions in which the decision maker “earned” power rather
than obtained power through desire or random processes.  That is, people that earn the right to
make allocative decisions are viewed as more legitimate and objective than decision makers
viewed as making decisions based on subjective or non-neutral processes.  This finding is
significant given that all participants receive a highly unfavorable outcome ($3 out of possible
$20).  Moreover, the authors find that people respond immediately and negatively to decisions
made by power hungry decision makers (see Hibbing and Alford 2004: 72).  This suggests a
preference for unambitious decision makers, and that there is a tendency to assume that
ambitious decision makers are self-serving and not to be trusted.
Hibbing and Alford’s, and Van Vugt et al.’s (2004) experiments are consistent with our
arguments in that they suggest people respond to the style of leadership as much as the quality of
the outcome they receive in social dilemmas.  In particular, the exercise of power and the means
through which one attains power affects whether people accept or reject an unfavorable outcome.
Put simply, people have a strong aversion to decision processes that violate the norm of fairness,
and tend to assume that leaders seen as ambitious for power are self-serving and non-neutral, and
therefore likely to take advantage of others, thus violating the norm of fairness.  Unfortunately,
the experiments to date have not considered the affect of gender.  Research on gender and trait
inferences overwhelmingly show that people use gender stereotypes to assume the traits of
political decision makers (Alexander and Anderson 1993; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993;
Sanbonmatsu 2002; see also Shapiro 2003).  There is also a broad experimental research
literature demonstrating that males and females behave differently in decision making situations
—for example, as legislators (see Kennedy 2003), and with regard to styles of leadership
(Rosenthal 1998).  Despite this, we are aware of no empirical studies that directly assess gender
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differences in the context of negative ambition, or test the behavioral implications of such
differences. 
Our conceptual framework, however, suggests that negative ambition is likely to be
viewed as a male trait.  This is important because reactions to negative ambition may be
mediated by gender.  All else equal, negative ambition in female decision makers may not
prompt such severe leveling mechanism responses as those in males.  Female policy makers
could conceivably even benefit from negative ambition if it is seen as a type of leveling
mechanism itself, i.e. as a way to counter negative ambition in males.  
Hypotheses and Methods
Based on the conceptual framework sketched above we expect that a decision maker
perceived as craving power (i.e. having negative ambition) will be viewed as unjust,
uncooperative and therefore mistrusted.  We also expect that people will support decision makers
perceived to be less ambitious to balance decision makers perceived to be more ambitious.  We
expect negative ambition to be perceived as a distinctly male decision maker trait.  We also
expect that female decision makers, under certain situations, may benefit from negative ambition
(specifically as a counter to a male with negative ambition).  These are empirical issues that serve
as hypotheses we test using an experimental research design.  By using experimental
methodology we are able to control and eliminate external influences as well as control the
number of considerations people might use in evaluating political decision makers.  For
gathering experimental data, we use MediaLab Research Software.  For the experiment we used
undergraduates at a large Midwestern university as the sample population.
In the experiment we asked participants to vote on a decision maker who will become
part of a group of three people who will divide 15 extra credit points.  Participants were informed
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that one decision maker---a highly ambitious decision maker or low ambitious decision maker----
has already been selected to the decision making group.  Participants are told that two of the three
people will be selected to decide how the points are divided.  The person not selected to be a
decision maker will get a chance to “vote” on at least one decision maker.  Participants were told
that through a random process they have been selected to be a voter rather than a decision maker
(in actuality, all participants are voters—the “decision makers” were a computer program).
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions, a high ambition condition and
a low ambition condition.  In the high ambition condition participants were told the first decision
maker already selected responded with a strong desire to be the decision maker.  In the low
ambition condition participants were told the first decision maker already selected responded
with a weak desire to be the decision maker.  
The role of the participants is to vote from a group of candidates, about whom they have
information on gender and ambition, for the second decision maker.  The list of candidates
contains two males (one of high ambition and one of low ambition) and two females (one of high
ambition and one of low ambition).  Following their vote, participants were then asked to wait a
moment while the group makes their decision regarding the division of the extra credit points.
All participants received the same unfair outcome (3 out of 15 extra credit points).  Following
this division, subjects were asked a series of questions about the decision, the decision making
group as a whole, and individuals within the decision making group.  Importantly, all participants
were debriefed and given the maximum number of extra credit points following the experiment.
Thus, each participant’s final grade was not dependent on decisions made during the experiment.
In the high ambition condition, the dependent variable will be a dichotomous variable: the
selection of either a high ambition or low ambition person to be the second decision maker.  We
hypothesize that people will be significantly more likely to select decision makers low in
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ambition given one highly ambitious decision maker.  In the low ambition condition, we also
expect people to select decision makers low in ambition.  We also plan to model an interaction
between gender and ambition.  Although we do not give the gender of the first decision maker,
we expect people to be significantly more likely to select a female in the high ambition condition.
Men tend to be perceived as highly independent, focusing on individual abilities and traits,
whereas women tend to be perceived as highly interdependent, focusing on their relationships
with others (Gardner and Gabriel 2004: 171).  Women also tend to be more generous than men
(Eckel and Grossman 1998) and tend to be stereotyped according to more prosocial behaviors
such as compassion, honesty, and empathy (Alexander and Anderson 1993; Huddy and
Terkildsen 1993).  Such empirical results support out theoretical expectation that self-serving
behavior is likely to be perceived as stemming from a male decision maker and therefore prompt
a preference for a female to balance out the male’s negative ambition.  Thus, in the high ambition
condition, we also expect people will be significantly more likely to select male as the gender of
the first decision maker compared to the low ambition condition.  In the low ambition condition,
we do not expect an interaction between gender and ambition.  
Also, in the high ambition condition we expect people will be significantly more likely to
select “the decision maker already assigned” as the decision maker more likely to be self-
interested, and “the decision maker you chose” as more likely to be fair.  That is, we expect
people to think the result of the unfair outcome was due to the self-interestedness of the first
decision maker already selected and not the person they chose to be the second maker.  We also
expect people to be significantly more satisfied with the decision and to think the dividers were
fairer in the low ambition condition compared to the high ambition condition.  If people associate
ambition with self-serving behavior, then people are likely to perceive the decision making
process as unfair given one highly ambitious decision maker.  
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Following these questions, participants were asked a series of demographic questions,
including age, year in school, education level, college major, political ideology, political party
affiliation, income, religiosity, race, gender, and trust in others.  
Results
In presenting the experimental results, we first test whether people tend to associate
ambition with male and self-serving behavior.  We do this by testing for variation in perceptions
of the first decision maker in both the high ambition and low ambition experimental conditions,
allowing for interactions with gender.   We then analyze the results regarding the selection of the
second decision maker, focusing on the effects of the interaction between gender and ambition on
decision maker selection.  By presenting the results in this manner, we are able test the
hypotheses that people associate ambition with male and self-interested behavior, and that people
will seek to offset ambitious decision makers with decision makers they perceive to be less
ambitious and less likely to be self-serving.6   
Figure 1 provides an analysis of perceptions of the gender of the first decision maker in
each experimental condition.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
As Figure 1 shows, in the high ambition condition people are significantly more likely to assume
the first decision maker is male as compared to female.  That is, when presented with information
that the decision maker had a strong desire to be the decision maker, people are significantly
6 Due to random assignment, there were 79 participants in the high ambition condition and 67
participants in the low ambition condition.  The gender composition of the high ambition and
low ambition condition was 59% male and 49% male respectively.  The mean age in each
condition was 19.97 and 20.03 respectively.
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more likely to assume the decision maker is male compared to conditions in which the decision
maker is presented as having a weak desire to be the decision maker.  Boehm (1999) finds that
males tend to be more likely to engage in upstartism than females.  The findings presented in
Figure 1 also suggest people tend to associate upstartism or big man behavior with males.
Figure 2 shows the effects of ambition on perceptions of self-interestedness and fairness.
As Figure 2 demonstrates, people tend equate ambition with self-serving behavior.  Decision
makers with a strong desire for power are perceived as significantly more likely to be self-
interested and significantly less fair than decision makers with a weak desire for power.  
[Insert Figure 2 here]
If you recall, in the experimental treatment, participants were asked to select a second decision
maker from a list of candidates.  After their selection, participants were told that the two decision
makers had decided to keep twelve points for themselves and give the participant just three
points.  Importantly, all participants received this highly unfavorable outcome.  What Figure 2
illustrates is that people tend to associate the unfair outcome with the motivations of the first
decision maker.  Highly ambitious decision makers are seen as being more responsible for the
unfavorable outcome than less ambitious decision makers.  This is demonstrated by evidence that
highly ambitious decision makers are perceived as being more self-interested and less fair than
the decision makers the participants chose.7  This is further supported by our null findings
7 Although not presented in this paper, the results of Figure 1 and Figure 2 are further
corroborated by logistic models.  Controlling for additional covariates such as perceptions of
trust, gender of the participant, year in school, major, ideology, party, income, religiosity, and
race, the only significant predictor is the experimental condition.  This holds across the three
dependent variables presented in Figure 1 and Figure 2 (perceptions of the gender of the first
decision maker, which decision maker is more likely to be self-interested, and which decision
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regarding the perceptions of the decision makers as a whole.  Because people tend to associate
the unfavorable outcome with the first decision maker already selected, questions regarding the
fairness of the two decision makers taken together do not differ between experimental
conditions.8  Taken with the results presented in Figure 1, this suggests negative ambition tends
to be associated with unfair, self-interested and male behavior.  
In Figure 3 we examine whether expectations of the gender of the decision maker affect
perceptions of fairness and self-interestedness.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
The top portion of Figure 3 shows that in the high ambition condition, regardless of whether
subjects guess the first decision maker is male or female, both are equally as likely to identify
this decision maker as the one most likely to be self-interested.  However, in the low ambition
condition, there is a significant difference.  Subjects who guess the first decision maker is female
are significantly less likely to identify this decision maker as the one most likely to be self-
interested (p < .10).  In other words, gender and ambition interact to influence perceptions of
self-interestedness.  While both ambitious and unambitious males are viewed as highly likely to
engage in self-serving behavior, unambitious females are considered less likely to do so when
compared to unambitious males.
maker is more likely to be fair).
8 When analyzing data regarding the fairness of the dividers, satisfaction with the outcome, and
self-interestedness of the dividers, we did not find statistical differences between the two
conditions.  Further, the results in Figure 1 and Figure 2 do not differ between genders.  That is,
there are no statistical differences between the responses of males and females to the dependent
variables presented in Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
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The bottom portion of Figure 3 switches the focus from perceptions of self-interestedness
to perceptions of fairness.  In the high ambition condition, subjects who guess the first decision
maker is male are significantly less likely to identify this decision maker as the one most likely to
be fair compared to subjects who believe the decision maker is female (p < .05).  In the low
ambition condition, subjects who believe the first decision maker is female again are more likely
to identify this decision maker as the one most likely to be fair compared to subjects who believe
the first decision maker is male.  While substantively different, this result does not reach
statistical significance.
If you recall, Figure 2 suggests people tend to believe ambitious decision makers are less
likely to be fair and more likely to be self-interested.  However, Figure 3 indicates an important
interaction with gender.  Ambitious females are viewed as significantly more likely to engage in
fair behavior compared to ambitious males.  In fact, Figure 3 also shows that ambitious females
are identified as more likely to be fair by 43% of the subjects while unambitious males are
identified as more likely to be fair by only 34% of the subjects.  While not a significant
difference, it does suggest ambitious females are not viewed as skeptically as ambitious males.
The next step is to examine who participants are choosing to be the second decision maker in the
experiment.
Figure 4 provides a descriptive analysis regarding the selection of the second decision
maker in each experimental condition.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
As Figure 4 shows, participants overwhelmingly selected high ambition females to be the second
decision maker in the experiment.  Moreover, there is no statistical difference between the
experimental conditions.  In both conditions participants are more likely to select high ambition
females as the second decision maker.  This suggests that females, unlike males, may benefit
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from a desire for power under certain conditions.  Specifically, female decision makers with a
negative ambition trait are a preferred leveling mechanism—they are seen as a way to rein in
ambitious male decision makers.  This finding and its interpretation fits with previous research.
Huddy and Terkildsen (1993: 138), for example find that people view “assertive women as best
equipped to deal with women’s issues.” This suggests people may be more likely to select a high
ambition female as a way to offset the ambitions of a perceived male decision maker.  Because
women are perceived as more compassionate than men, a desirous female decision maker may be
an appropriate counter to a desirous male decision maker.  To explore this hypothesis, we
examine the relationship between perceptions of gender of the first decision maker and selection
of a high ambition female as the second decision maker in Figure 5.
[Insert Figure 5 here]
Focusing on the high ambition condition in the top portion of Figure 5, people who
assume the first decision maker is male are significantly more likely to select a high ambition
female as the second decision maker than people who think the first decision maker is female.  In
the low ambition condition we do not find any difference between perceptions of the gender of
the first decision maker and selection of a high ambition female as the second decision maker.  In
other words, it appears that gender interacts with ambition in the selection of decision makers.
People tend to associate self-interestedness with males and therefore prefer a female to offset a
high likelihood of self-interested behavior.  Importantly, however, they do not prefer just any
female, but rather a female as ambitious as their male counterparts.  And, as Figure 3 shows,
people tend to expect more cooperative behavior from ambitious females compared to ambitious
males.
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Conclusion
Within the literature on trait inferences, trustworthiness is commonly found to
significantly affect candidate evaluations.  But what causes perceptions of trustworthiness? 9  Do
other traits influence perceptions of trustworthiness, possibly perceptions of negative ambition?
Does power-hungry behavior detract from a candidate’s warmth and trustworthiness?  Due to a
lack of theory, candidate traits are generally treated independent of one another.  Because people
are sensitive to perceptions of fairness, and because people tend to associate upstartism with self-
serving behavior, we argue that the trait of ambition in political candidates influences perceptions
9 Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk (1986) use trustworthiness as part of their integrity
dimension, as does Kinder (1986).  However, Kinder et al. (1980) use power-hungry as a
measure of trustworthiness.  Because Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk use “humbleness” as
part of their charisma dimension, this suggests trustworthiness could cross their integrity and
charisma dimensions.  Kinder’s analysis suggests trustworthiness could fall across both the
integrity and empathy dimensions depending on whether it is associated with judgments of
honesty or fairness.  In fact, Funk (1996a: 107) finds that empathy and integrity are highly
correlated (r = .89).  Similarly, while Funk distinguishes between warmth and trustworthiness,
she recognizes that trustworthiness is often “treated in conjunction with sociability or warmth”
(108).  Finally, Rahn et al. (1990) find that personal qualities, as measured by trustworthiness,
selfishness, and warmth, outperform competence in terms of predicting affect toward political
candidates.  This suggests perceptions of negative ambition and trustworthiness are closely
linked to other trait dimensions.  Because existing analyses lack theoretical assumptions as to
why trust matters, however, we are left to wonder if any causal relationships exist between traits.
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of trustworthiness.  Leaders exhibiting overly ambitious behavior are likely to be viewed
negatively and as illegitimate decision makers. 
In this paper we demonstrate that gender provides both a cue as to the relative ambition of
a person and whether a person’s displayed ambition is likely to be positive or negative.  Using
laboratory experiments, we find that people tend to associate high ambition with self-
interestedness and male behavior.  As a result, this affects perceptions of fairness, regardless of
the outcome of the decision.  Furthermore, we find an important effect for the interaction
between gender and ambition on decision maker selection.  Regardless of the ambition of the
first decision maker, people tend to prefer highly ambitious females as the second decision
maker.  Even more revealing, in the high ambition condition, if participants believe the first
decision maker is a male, there is a significant increase in the number of high ambition females
selected to be the second decision maker.  In other words, given one highly ambitious decision
maker, people are more likely to select a high ambition female to offset what they perceive to be
a highly ambitious and self-interested male.  This suggests female ambition is perceived as
something different from male ambition.  
The findings of this experiment have important implications for the study of trait
inferences and mass political behavior.  Although traits relating to competence, trustworthiness,
and warmth have been cited as particularly relevant to candidate evaluations, there is no pre-
existing theory in political science for why these traits are important.10  The findings presented in
10 For discussion and treatment of the various trait dimensions see Bartels (2002), Funk (1996a,
1996b, 1997, 1999), Kinder et al. (1980), Kinder (1986), King (2002), Miller and Shanks (1996),
Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk (1986).  The five dimensions from Miller, Wattenberg, and
Malanchuk (1986) are competence, integrity, reliability, charisma, and personal.  From Kinder et
al. (1980) there are two dimensions, competence and trustworthiness, which are later split into
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this paper suggest the theoretical foundation for the traits of ambition and trustworthiness may lie
outside of mainstream political science.  Specifically, we draw on research from anthropology
and evolutionary psychology.  We find that ambition affects perceptions of fairness and
trustworthiness.  As we argue, this fits nicely with evidence from anthropology of a strong
aversion to “big-man” behavior among leaders (Boehm 1999, 1993).  This provides an
interesting explanation as to why the public has reacted vociferously to public attempts of what
they perceive to be self-aggrandizing behavior.  
For example, think about the recent surge in public support for term limits.  Despite
empirical evidence suggesting term limits impose heavy burdens on legislators and legislatures,
often resulting in more inefficient government, the public remains fully supportive of limiting the
amount of time legislators are able to serve as powerful decision makers (Carey, Niemi, and
Powell 2000).  On a more local level, think about Jane Mansbridge’s (1980) analysis of
participatory democracy.  People who speak up at local meetings to voice their opinion tend to be
viewed negatively and with suspicion by others.  From the perspective of others sitting quietly,
overt displays of opinion may be seen as a sign of upstartism.  In fact, one of the evolutionary
outcomes of patrilocal group living, where females rather than males disperse into non-kin
groups, is that a dominant female survival strategy is to seek to abide by group norms and avoid
“sticking out” (Campbell 2002, 117-118).  
Future studies of trait inferences will require a methodology that allows for causal
inference.  As King (2002: 15) writes, experimental design is the only method that allows for
“disentanglement” of the relationship between trait inferences and candidate evaluation.  King
goes on to argue that the experimental method is “impossible” to apply to the study of the effects
four dimensions: competence, leadership, integrity, and empathy (Kinder 1986).  And finally
from Funk (1996a), the dimensions are competence, trustworthiness, and warmth/sociability.
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of candidate traits.  What King seems to be confusing however, is the difference between field
experiments and laboratory experiments.  While King is correct that reconstructing an election
with the same candidates but different traits would be impossible, laboratory experiments
provide a useful and simplistic method for assessing how variation in candidate traits affect
political behavior.  In a lab setting, it is possible to control for all external influences while
manipulating a single explanatory variable; in this case the trait of the candidate or decision
maker.  Unfortunately, while the use of experimental design in political science is quite frequent
and continually increasing, few scholars have applied it to the study of candidate traits.11  
Discussion
If we are correct that negative ambition, or an overt desire for power, provides a cue
regarding the trustworthiness of others, this has important behavioral implications.  For example,
Scholz (1998: 137) argues that “trust heuristics” affect the likelihood of compliance with
authoritative requests.  In particular, Scholz and Scholz and Lubell (1998) examine compliance
with tax policy.  People tend to be more likely to comply with existing tax regulations if they
perceive both government and citizens as trustworthy, both of which are independent of fear of
government punishment for noncompliance.  In other words, when people perceive the
government as generally honest and unlikely to engage in dishonest behavior, and other citizens
as unlikely to cheat on their taxes, people are more likely to follow the law as it relates to tax
policy.  This suggests compliance with authoritative requests is related to the personal traits of
others, specifically perceptions of trustworthiness, which we argue are grounded in perceptions
of ambition.
11 The notable exception here is the work of Carolyn Funk (1997, 1996b).
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Scholz (1998) and Scholz and Lubell (1998), however, do not consider whether certain
personal traits project trustworthiness.  Rather, their main argument is that perceived
trustworthiness of others affects compliance with particular policies, neglecting the root causes of
trustworthiness.  From the work of Tyler (2001a, 1990; Tyler and DeGoey 1996) and Hibbing
and Theiss-Morse (2002, 1995) on procedural justice, the motivations of decision makers,
particularly the perception of a neutral authority, appear to be significant factors in terms of
forming judgments about the fairness of the decision making process.  People who perceive
decision makers to be motivated by neutral considerations are most likely to approve of the
process, regardless of whether the final outcome is favorable.  Thus it stands to reason that
perceptions of the motivations of decision makers may be affecting the “trust in government”
variable in Scholz’s study.  In other words, a change in trust may occur due to changes in the
perceptions of the motivations of the decision maker rather than changes in the perceptions of
policy outcomes.  Indeed, as we would argue, negative ambition provides a cue regarding the
trustworthiness of others, thereby affecting satisfaction and compliance with outcomes.  This has
significant implications for what Tyler (2001b:248) calls “the viability of the political system.”  
Authoritative figures perceived as illegitimate are likely to be ineffective as managers.
Beginning with Chester Barnard’s (1938) “acceptance theory,” perceptions of bureaucratic
authority have been critical to the study of public management theory.  Barnard argued that the
effectiveness of administrative authority depends on the willingness of others to accept and
comply with such authority.  To be effective, leaders need a high degree of “social intelligence,”
or the ability to relate well with others and exert interpersonal influence (Hall et al. 2004: 522).
House and Howell (1992) distinguish between “personalized” and “socialized” charisma, arguing
that the former, by taking the form of an authoritative and self-aggrandizing leader, detracts from
managerial effectiveness.  Leaders with “political skill” are more likely to successfully influence
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others as defined by compliance with authoritative requests, thus contributing to overall
leadership effectiveness, than leaders lacking such skills (Ammeter et al. 2002; Douglas and
Ammeter 2004; Hall et al. 2004).  Leaders able to project trustworthiness through non-self-
aggrandizing behavior are likely to trigger positive reactions from followers, “even in the context
of unethical or illegal behavior” (Hall et al. 2004: 525).  In other words, the political style of
leaders directly affects their ability to successfully influence subordinates.  Thus, the trait of
ambition is fundamental to the political style and effectiveness of the organizational leaders.
Women who are successful in gaining office and keeping it are often those who present
themselves as having a clear and deliberate message, and represent themselves as “independent a
decision maker as any man, but more caring and trustworthy” (Witt, Paget and Matthews 1995:
214).  This suggests that support for governmental decisions will not only rest on the perception
of fairness regarding the decision making process but also on perceptions regarding the traits of
individual decision makers, specifically their level of ambition.  
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Figure 1:
The Effects of Ambition on Perceptions of Gender
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Figure 2:
The Effects of Ambition on Perceptions of Self-Interestedness and Fairness
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Figure 3:
The Effects of Perceptions of Gender and Ambition on Self-Interestedness and Fairness
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Figure 4:
The Effects of Ambition on Decision Maker Selection
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Figure 5:
The Effects of Gender and Ambition on Decision Maker Selection
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